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12 April 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR: Executive Director-Comptroller


SUBJECT : Organizational Arrangements in the National Security Field

Red:

1. You have asked me to read the Director's memorandum to the Chairman, President's Task Force on Government Organization prepared as a basis for the Director's meeting with that group which is to take place on April 15. The memorandum is strong in the area of the intelligence community's interface with the State Department's policy guidance and programs and with the programs of other foreign affairs agencies. It tends to avoid substance on the DCI's role as intelligence coordinator. I believe this is a gap.

2. In meeting with the Task Force, it is quite likely that this coordinator role will be of considerable interest, especially to a group formed to consider reorganization Government-wide. The back-up material needed by the Director should anticipate this possible avenue of inquiry and provide the Director with an identification of the programs he has in mind to improve current conditions. NIPE has its work cut out to supply this.

3. In the event that the Task Force is concerned with the structure and mechanisms which have been created to coordinate the plans, programs and procedures of the intelligence community it would be well to supply the Director in advance with brief descriptions of USIB and USIB committee functions, the NRO, other instruments, and the role of NIPE staff. With regard to USIB, it might be useful to describe the committees' functions as falling into general categories, rather than to cover each one separately. For example, it could be pointed out that there are USIB committees which are concerned primarily with the coordination of intelligence production in critical areas such as atomic energy and guided missiles, some of which are concerned primarily with the establishment and coordination of collection targets and priorities (e.g., the IPC, COMOR, and SIGINT committees), and some which have been established to deal with special intelligence problems, such as CODIB in the information processing area. It would seem to be especially important, in view of the Director's responsibilities, to deal with the

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Security Committee's functions, particularly in the field of audio countermeasures and with the CCPC in coordinating the community's attack on critical intelligence problems.

4. There are other formal mechanisms which have been established to assist in the coordination of community plans and programs which also could be mentioned and which might be of interest to the Task Force. The DCI's responsibility to establish PNIOs, for example, is illustrative of devices to create unity and provide a singleness of purpose to community efforts. Other systems for coordination, such as the Consolidated Cryptologic Program, the Consolidated Intelligence Program and the PPBS are also very good examples of the community's attempts to achieve coordination and optimum cost-benefit results in the management of intelligence programs. In this general area it may be useful to include some brief description of the role of the NRO and of ~~WPAE~~ staff.

5. If it occurs during the course of his meeting with the Task Force that the Director is asked for his evaluation of intelligence community coordination mechanisms and procedures it would be well to have provided some back-up in this areas as well. There may be areas in USIB, for example, where organizational and procedural improvements are planned (for example, the "instrumentality" which was proposed as a result of the JIRG study) which should be mentioned to the Task Force. There may be other areas where you may believe it would be beneficial for the Director to point out institutional weaknesses in the system and to provide constructive suggestions for improvements.

6. With the specific reference to the DCI's memorandum to the Task Force, you asked whether any of the passages might raise questions for which back-up should be provided the Director. The following are offered:

a. Ref. para. 4., page 2: What is the intent of this statement? Why does it not list some of the publications of other intelligence agencies?

b. Ref. para. 6.a., page 3: What specific effect on intelligence operations has resulted from less use of the NSC in the past two Administrations? How frequently, or what percentage of your projects do you place before the 303 Committee?

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c. Ref. para. 6.c., page 4: What sorts of things have been the subjects of NSAMs? How many have been issued? What gaps exist in DCI judgment?

7. You may want to pass these comments along to NIPE.

/s/

John M. Clarke

Distribution:

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Orig to DDC

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THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505

8 April 1967


**MEMORANDUM FOR: Chairman, President's Task Force
on Government Organization**

**SUBJECT: Organizational Arrangements in the
National Security Field**

1. In response to the request passed on by Mr. Bohen, I would like to outline some of the ways in which the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), and I as the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI), support and cooperate with other elements of the Government, within the national security structure.

2. The DCI has two principal functions. One is running the CIA. The other involves responsibilities with respect to all the foreign intelligence agencies of the Government, which together make up the so-called intelligence community. This consists of the intelligence components of State, Defense, the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) and the military services, as well as the National Security Agency (NSA), the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and the CIA.

3. In this second capacity the DCI is looked to by the President as the principal intelligence officer of the Government and is charged with coordination and guidance of the total United States foreign



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intelligence effort. The most important instrument in accomplishing this coordination and guidance is the United States Intelligence Board (USIB), with its 14 subordinate standing committees. The Board was established by the National Security Council as an advisory body to assist the DCI in carrying out his community responsibilities. I serve as Chairman. I also have a small, highly qualified personal staff to assist me in the coordinating role. There are a series of National Security Council Intelligence Directives (NSCID's) and implementing Director of Central Intelligence Directives (DCID's) which spell out respective roles and procedures within the intelligence community.

I assume that this intra-community coordination is of secondary interest to the committee, but I can of course elaborate to whatever extent you wish when I meet with you.

4. With respect to intelligence, the relations of CIA and of the intelligence community with other agencies of Government can be somewhat arbitrarily broken down into support given through published intelligence documents, by membership in standing groups and committees and other miscellaneous methods of interface.

(See Tab A.)

5. You have also asked for information on sources of guidance to CIA for action operations as contrasted to intelligence ones.

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This guidance comes in a number of ways and has proved to be effective, particularly in light of the unique character of covert operations. (See Tab B.)

6. So much for the existing mechanisms of support and guidance. You have also asked for my views on what has been called "instruments of integration." As I see them, the principal mechanisms of this kind are those listed at Tab C. I will comment briefly on each of them as it affects the intelligence community and the Central Intelligence Agency.

a. The National Security Council (NSC). It has been suggested that I discuss the effect on intelligence operations of the fact that the NSC has not been used as extensively in the past two Administrations as it once was. This fact as such has not affected intelligence operations greatly. While the CIA is responsible to the NSC, I believe it was never intended that that body be looked to for effective continuing intelligence guidance. When the Council was meeting regularly, the sessions were usually opened with a current intelligence briefing by the DCI. The function of keeping principal NSC members advised of pertinent intelligence is now handled in other ways, as I have indicated earlier. The problem is not so much one of a gap in intelligence guidance

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as one of working out the means of intelligence support which will be most useful to other components of the Government. This is a continuing process.

b. 303 Committee. Despite the greatly decreased level of NSC activity, guidance in the field of covert action continues to be effectively handled through a high-level committee set up by NSC directive. This is the 303 Committee, formerly known as the Special Group, and it is the principal policy approval authority for covert action operations. It is very important for the CIA, and to a lesser degree for DOD, but it is a specialized mechanism. As a result of recent widely publicized disclosures, this Committee will engage in more extensive and longer range examinations of these programs than it has to date.

c. The National Security Action Memoranda (NSAM's) are important documents with the full weight of the White House behind them. They are designed to give guidance and direction to all aspects of the national security effort. They seldom attempt to give detailed guidance to the intelligence community but they are of great significance in indicating a framework for intelligence coordination and support which might be required.

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d. Department of State National Policy Papers.

There is some question in my mind as to the net advantage deriving to the Government from this series of papers. One of the principal problems, I believe, is the length of time it takes to produce them (sometimes several years) so that often by the time they are fully agreed and published they are already somewhat out of date. In the meantime, policy making and execution--being necessarily a dynamic, constantly-shifting process--must go on. Thus decisions are taken outside the parameters of these papers. The more important a country the more this is likely to be so.

Although the policy papers do not mention CIA activities, we comment on the papers from the point of view of the factual intelligence foundations from which the policy promulgations stem. Additionally, we make suggestions as appropriate in cases where we might have something to contribute in terms of objectives and tactics.

I believe that the Senior Interdepartmental Group (SIG)/Interdepartmental Regional Group (IRG) mechanism is more useful in developing practical policy than the slower-moving device of papers of this sort, which involve a really sizeable amount of work by responsible officers. They

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certainly are of some value; it could be argued, however, that the time spent on them could be used to better advantage elsewhere.

e. SIG and IRG's. In general the IRG's are particularly useful to members of the intelligence community. They provide useful forums where relevant intelligence can be brought to the attention of policy makers--particularly information on Communist penetration and subversion abroad. Moreover, participation in the IRG's keeps us informed on regional situations and operational problems in the Government. This permits CIA to identify in broad terms possible requirements for intelligence and for covert action in support of policy and thus to target its operations more effectively. It also gives the CIA formal representation at an effective level of the foreign policy structure.

Such committees cannot, of course, usurp the basic foreign policy responsibilities of the President and the Department of State, but they certainly at a minimum contribute to better understanding of major problems by all responsible agencies. This is particularly true with respect to the less developed areas of the world.

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The effectiveness of the IRG's depends to a considerable degree on the capabilities and diligence of their individual members, and on the direction that the Chairmen provide. It might help to achieve more decisive results if the attendance at meetings were tailored to the problem at hand, and if dissent rather than consensus were encouraged. Dissents could then be resolved at the SIG or at a higher level.

The operation of the SIG is necessarily different from that of the IRG's and it raises certain basic questions as to the proper role of such a body. For example, Mr. Marks has posed a problem as to whether the SIG should restrict itself to being a reviewing authority or court of appeal for actions taken by the IRG's or whether it should itself inspire new initiatives in the foreign policy field. My own feeling is that the SIG should do some of both. On the other hand, if the IRG's function smoothly and efficiently, they should be able to accomplish most of the on-going work involving interagency coordination, including inspiration for new initiatives. Certain problems cut across the jurisdictional area of more than one IRG and thus disagreements could arise which would require resolution at the SIG level or higher.

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f. Foreign Affairs Programming System (FAPS).

This proposed system has been under discussion for a number of months. It is designed to integrate planning and programming of operations of the various agencies in the field. The Bureau of Inter-American Affairs (ARA) of State has also instituted a pilot program of its own which is consistent with the FAPS objectives. This program, known as Country Analysis Strategy Papers (CASP), has taken the form of a practical schedule for coordinating individual agency programs at the Embassy level and then having them reviewed by the IRG with coordinating assistance from the country director of the State Department.

The FAPS and CASP concepts have, I believe, a potential for producing useful results, particularly in terms of providing the same sort of coordination at the Washington level that obtains in a well-ordered Embassy country team. It may be, if the CASP process proves to be as useful as it appears to be so far, that it could take the place of FAPS.

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In any case, it will be necessary to make sure--
as is being done in the ARA area--that intelligence and
covert action activities are not included in the consolidated
programs. This applies not only to CIA but also to clandestine activities of the DOD, and it is a necessary concomitant of the program if the security of such operations is to be safeguarded. As you know, the DCI has as one of his statutory functions the protection of intelligence sources and methods from unauthorized disclosure.

g. Personal Consultations. By their nature the conduct of foreign affairs and of intelligence operations form a constantly shifting pattern. It is impossible to predict with any consistent clarity the numerous important developments or indeed crises which constantly arise. Accordingly, it is necessary to maintain a pattern of frequent personal consultations at all levels. In the intelligence field this can include occasional conferences between the DCI and the President and his principal advisors; meetings with the Secretary of State and other high-level officials of that Department; with the Secretary and Deputy Secretary of Defense; with the Joint Chiefs; and so on down to continuing contact between respective desk officers in CIA and in State.

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The regular meetings between Clandestine Services Division Chiefs and the respective regional Assistant Secretaries of State are particularly valuable to CIA. Relationships with the top level of DOD, involving direct intelligence support, have been especially close. I believe that there has been a considerable advance in recent years in the mature understanding of each other's problems and thus in constructive cooperation in solving these problems.

h. Ad Hoc Committees and Task Forces. Since it is not possible nor probably desirable to establish a rigid mechanism to accommodate all national security problems, it is inevitable that there will be a number of ad hoc committees and task forces established from time to time. A number of these are set up within the intelligence community structure and numbers of others are established which involve intelligence participation. As a general rule, I think most responsible officials will agree that one should attempt to avoid "ad hoc-ery," but this is not always possible nor in every case desirable. Just as bad as a proliferation of ad hoc groups is the continuance of standing committees or task forces past a point of productive life.

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
i. Bureau of the Budget Reviews. These are necessary and generally useful tools for bringing intelligence programs into line with over-all Government operations and policies. Contrary to apparent popular opinion, and as members of this committee know, CIA gets a pretty thorough going-over in the course of these reviews--and I welcome it.

j. Congressional Committees and The President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board (PFIAB). We get useful support from our relations with the four subcommittees of the Congress to which CIA reports. We keep the PFIAB fully informed on our activities and we get advice from that Board. It serves as a special link to the President.

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1. USIB. I have touched on this device for coordinating the intelligence community. I can develop the subject further if you wish.

Richard Helms

Attachments

Tabs A, B and C

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I. Intelligence Support (a representative list)

A. Publications

1. President's Daily Brief (PDB)
2. Central Intelligence Bulletin (CIB)
3. National Intelligence Estimates (NIE's) and
Special National Intelligence Estimates (SNIE's)
4. National Intelligence Projections for Planning (NIPP's)
5. Special CIA studies and reports (e.g., Office of
Current Intelligence (OCI), Office of Research and Reports (ORR),
Office of Scientific Intelligence (OSI) memoranda)
6. USIB-sponsored studies (e.g., Infiltration into
South Vietnam,
7. Joint studies (e.g., Assessment of Effects of
Vietnam Bombing, with DIA)
8. Weekly Report for Senior Interdepartmental Group (SIG)

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B. Through Standing Groups and Committees

1. National Security Council (NSC), through DCI
as Advisor
2. SIG and Interdepartmental Regional Groups (IRG's),
through regular membership on these bodies
3. Committee of Principals (disarmament)

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4. Economic Defense Advisory Committee

(support to Secretary of State)

~~5. Advisory Committee on Economic Policy~~

~~(support to Secretary of Commerce)~~

6. Advisory Committee on Export Policy

(support to Secretary of Commerce)

7. Ad Hoc Committees

C. Other

1. Responses to special requests from Secretary of State, Secretary of Defense, White House, etc.

2. Direct support to Ambassadors overseas

3. Representatives at military commands

(e.g., SAC, NORAD, SACLANT,

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4. Briefings of President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board (PFIAB) and Congressional Committees

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II. Policy Guidance Mechanisms for Action Operations


- A. 303 Committee
- B. Regular meetings between Clandestine Services Division
Chiefs and regional Assistant Secretaries of State
- C. Deputy for Coordination, Bureau of Intelligence and
Research, Department of State
- D. Special Assistant for Counter Insurgency and Special
Activities, Joint Staff
- E. Contingency Coordinating Committee (possible use of
military force)
- F. War planners with major commands
- G. Ambassadors
- H. National Security Action Memoranda (NSAM's)
- I. Personal consultations

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III. "Instruments for Integration"

- A. NSC
- B. 303
- C. NSAM's
- D. Department of State National Policy Papers
- E. SIG, IRG's
- F. Foreign Affairs Programming System (FAPS)
- G. Personal consultations at all levels
- H. Ad hoc committees
- I. BOB reviews
- J. Congressional reviews; PFIAB reviews



- L. USIB